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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
J. STANLEY FRY and BEVERLY 
FRY, 
Plaintiff s/Appellants, 
vs. 
DUCE SPORTING GOODS, INC. , 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendant/Respondent 
and Third-Party Plaintiff, 
v s . 
STARFIRE INDUSTRIES, INC. , a 
Utah corporation, and HARDIN 
MARINE, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
Case No. 14095 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff brought this action seeking rescission of a contract for 
the purchase of a power boat and damages because of alleged breaches of 
express and implied warranties under the Uniform Commercial Code. Defen-
dant brought a Counterclaim for the unpaid balance of the purchase price of 
the boat and in defense asserts that there was no breach of any warranty, 
that Plaintiffs failed to prove any damage resulting from a breach of warranty 
and failed to prove that there was rescission of the purchase contract or 
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timely revocation of acceptance of the boat . Defendant brought a third-
party action against Starfire Industr ies , I n c . , the hull manufacturer, and 
Hardin Marine, the engine and jet outdrive supplier . 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The District Court of Salt Lake County, Judge Bryant H. Croft 
presiding, granted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs1 Complaint, 
based on Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, for failure to 
show that on the facts and the law Plaintiffs had a right to relief, and 
entered Judgment on Defendant's Counterclaim in favor of Defendant and 
against the Plaintiffs for the unpaid balance on the purchase contract plus 
cos ts and at torney 's fees totaling $9 ,889.14 plus 8% interest 'from April 29, 
1975, until pa id . 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks denial of Plaintiffs1 Appeal and affirmance of 
the Order and Judgment entered by the lower court . 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
During the spring and summer of 1972, J. Stanley Fry (herein-
after "Fry'1) contacted Mr. FarrellHolding, a salesman and personal friend 
of Fry's who worked for Duce Sporting Goods, Inc . (hereinafter "Defen-
dant" or "Duce") , at Defendant 's place of bus iness regarding the purchase 
of a power boa t . Fry was interested in purchasing a new high-performance 
boat and he had been unable to find any boat which he thought would per -
form satisfactori ly for him (R. 181). He had previously owned a 19-foot 
s ingle-engine Higgins Boat with a propeller outdrive. Defendant did not 
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have a boat which was satisfactory to Fry (R. 231). Fry wanted a boat 
which would be large enough to have sleeping quarters but which also 
would be a fast, high-performance boat, and which could be used for 
water skiing (R. 148, 232). During the summer of 1972, Fry, his wife, 
and others made several trips to Defendant's place of business and to 
other boat dealerships regarding the purchase of a boat (R. 186, 230, 
231). Plaintiffs were unable to find a power boat at Defendant's place of 
business or at any other dealers which was the type of boat they wanted 
(R. 231). During the course of Fry's shopping for a power boat, he 
examined boats with different types of hulls and different types of power 
units, and he discussed this withFarrell Holding (R. 181). In August of 
1972, Fry indicated to Mr. Holding that he had found a power unit which 
consisted of a 440 cubic inch Chrysler engine with a propeller outdrive 
which he thought would be satisfactory, and he wanted to know if Holding 
could contact Starfire and see if they could install that unit in a boat for 
him (R. 185). Mr. Holding then contacted Starfire's place of business in 
Salt Lake City and arranged a meeting between Fry and Starfire (R. 185). 
At the meeting, Mr. Webber of Starfire informed Fry that the 
Chrysler power unit was not available any more (R. 185, 186). Fry took 
a tour of the Starfire plant and inspected the boats and different power 
units. Fry discussed a particular Jacuzzi jet propulsion mechanism with 
Mr. Webber and explained that since Fry was a water skier he wanted 
enough power in this boat to be able to ski in the same manner as he had 
skied with his other boat (R.186). Mr. Webber stated that he felt the 
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Jacuzzi unit would propel the boat satisfactorily (R. 186). Starfire then 
contacted Hardin Marine in California by telephone to see if the Jacuzzi 
unit was available for ins ta l la t ion . Starfire was informed that the Jacuzzi 
unit and a 455 cubic inch Oldsmobile engine were ava i lab le , which infor-
mation was relayed to Fry who then requested a 454 cubic inch Chevrolet 
engine. instead and asked Starfire to see if Hardin could supply that unit 
(R. 187). Starfire found out from Holding that the Chevrolet engine was 
available and it could be used with the Jacuzzi Jet . Starfire cautioned 
Fry at the time that the Chevrolet engine was a very high-performance 
engine which would not have a warranty (R. 188). The 454 cubic inch 
Chevrolet engine develops 450 horsepower; the 455 cubic inch Oldsmobile 
develops 295 to 325 horsepower (R. 415, 419). At this point, Plaintiff 
had se lected a deep "V" 22-foot hull , and he requested that hul l , the 
454 Chevrolet engine, and the Jacuzzi Jet be put together for him, that 
Duce order the boat, and stated that if Starfire would guarantee that the 
boat would be completed by a certain date he would buy it (R. 188). The 
next day he returned to Defendants place of bus iness with $500.00 
earnest money. The contract of sa le was executed three days later on 
August 15, 1972 (R. 171, 189). 
Plaintiffs brought this action requesting resc i ss ion of the con-
tract of sa le on September 12, 1973 (R. 3) . They had, by the time of t r i a l , 
kept and used the boat for approximately two yea r s , putting approximately 
74 hours running time on the engine (R. 236). Plaintiffs never tendered the 
boat back to Defendant nor revoked the sale (R. 236, 237). Plaintiffs have 
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complained that the boat is not satisfactory for water skiing because it 
does not pull two water skiers well, although it has on occasion pulled 
two water skiers (R. 233). During the summer of 1973, Defendant made 
several attempts to improve the performance of the boat, at the request of 
Fry, by adjusting the power unit (R. 192, 193), installing trim tabs to 
accelerate planing (R. 203), adjusting the jet (R. 198), and installing a 
new jet (R. 209). None of these changes or adjustments satisfied Fry. 
Duce Sporting Goods never made a representation to the Plaintiffs with 
regard to the boat or power unit and their performance (R. 232, 233). 
Fry never explained to Defendant what he wanted in a boat in terms of 
performance and did not request or expect Defendant to furnish a boat 
that would meet any specific standard of performance. Fry stated in his 
testimony at trial that he knew what he wanted and that he did not rely 
on others to provide it (R. 230, 231). Fry selected the engine, jet drive 
system, and the hull and merely asked Defendant to arrange the assembly 
and purchase of the package. 
At the conclusion of Plaintiffs' presentation of evidence, Defen-
dant moved for dismissal on the grounds that upon the facts and the law 
Plaintiffs had failed to show any right to relief. The Court granted Defen-
dant's Motion and entered a Judgment in favor of Defendant on Defendant's 
Counterclaim in an amount equal to the stipulated unpaid balance on the 
purchase contract, along with attorney's fees and cos ts . 
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ARGUMENT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The gravamen of Plaintiffs1 Complaint is that the power boat pur-
chased from Defendant failed to consis tent ly maintain sufficient power to 
pull two water skiers in the manner that Plaintiffs desire (R. 233). How-
ever, the boat was purchased as a multi-purpose boat , to be large enough 
to have sleeping accommodations as well a s to pull water skiers (R. 230, 
231, 232). Plaintiffs essent ia l ly claim that the failure of the craft to per-
form in accordance with Plaintiffs' specific desires was a breach of express 
and implied warranties and that Plaintiffs, therefore, should be awarded 
damages and resc i ss ion of the contract . However, the Trial Court ruled 
that there were no express or implied warranties made which were breached 
by Defendant, that no damages were proved, and that no resc i s s ion or 
timely revocation was made. The Trial Court s ta ted that "Even when viewed 
in a light most favorable to plaintiffs, . . • there being no evidence of any 
breach of any warranty by Duce, . . . Duce's motion to dismiss Plaintiffs ' 
c a se must be , and is granted." (R. I l l , 112). 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT DID NOT BREACH ANY WARRANTIES, 
(a) Express Warranty: 
Plaintiffs complain that Defendant breached express warranties 
to them concerning the boat in question and cite a s authority Section 
70A-2-313, U . C . A . (1953) and a Utah c a s e , Carver v . Denn, 17 Utah 180, 
214 P. 2d 118, (1950). The statute supports Defendants case rather than 
• - 6 -. 
Plaintiffs1 case, and Carver v. Denn is clearly distinguishable in the 
facts. 
The statute states: 
11
 (a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller 
to the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part 
of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty 
that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise. 
"(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of 
the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that 
the goods shall conform to the description. 
" 2 . It is not necessary to the creation of an express war-
ranty that the seller use formal words such as 'warrant' 
or "guarantee1 or that he have a specific intention to make 
a warranty, but an affirmation merely of the value of the 
goods or a statement purporting to be merely the seller1 s 
opinion or commendation of the goods does not create a 
warranty." (§ 70A-2-313, U.C.A. (1953)) (Emphasis 
added) 
Plaintiff's attempt to find an express warranty fails because, 
as indicated in the record, Defendant never made any affirmation of fact 
or descriptions contemplated by the statute with regard to the performance 
of the boat (R. 237). 
On Cross Examination, Plaintiff J. Stanley Fry responded to 
questions asked by Defendant's counsel as follows: 
"Q: Now, Mr. Fry, when you went with Mr. Holding and 
Mr. Malouf down to Starfire, at that point Duce had not made 
any representations to you as to any boat to buy particularly, 
had they? 
11
 A: They tried to sell me what they had on the floor, natu-
rally. 
"THE COURT: That isn't the question, Mr. Fry. 
"THE WITNESS: No, they did not. 
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"Q: So, that when you went down there , you went through 
the plant and looked at the different boats that were a v a i l -
able there at Starfire; was that not so? 
"A: Correct . 
"Q: Did anyone at Duce Sporting Goods make any repre-
sentat ions to you as to what that motor or pump would do on 
the boat that you finally purchased? 
nA:' ' No. .::;' 
"Q: Did anyone at Duce make any representat ion to you that 
the boat you finally purchased would pull two water sk ie r s? 
"A: No ." ..:;\;/' 
Plaintiffs further claim that Defendant made warranties by and 
through sa les personnel of Starfire. If any representat ions were made to 
Plaintiff, they were made by Starfire (R. 232, 233). Plaintiffs have presented 
no evidence that Starfire1 s sa les personnel were agents of Defendants and the 
Trial Court so ruled. Instead of an agency argument, Plaintiff makes the novel , 
albeit unsupported argument, that representat ions of Starfire bind Defendant 
because Defendant was allegedly present when Fry dealt with Starfire, even 
though Defendant made no representat ions and did not stock a boat such as 
the one Plaintiff bought or any of i ts component pa r t s . 
The trier of fact, after hearing the evidence and reading counse l s ' 
Memoranda of Law, found: 
11
 In my opinion the evidence , even when viewed in 
a light most favorable to Plaintiffs, compels a negative 
answer to that ques t ion . It was Fry who found no s a t i s -
faction in Duce's supply of b o a t s . It was Fry who c a n -
vassed other boat dealers in town . It was Fry who got a 
line on a Chrysler engine . It was Fry who asked Holding 
to meet him at Starfire. It was Fry who se lec ted the d e e p -
V hul l . It was Fry who chose the Chevrolet engine in place 
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of the Oldsmobile and the Jacuzzi to go with i t . It was 
Fry who rejected Starfire's suggestion that he use twin 
j e t s . It was Fry who was the moving force in putting the 
boat together to meet his d e s i r e s . Any opinion that the 
combination of elements chosen would probably meet Fry's 
requirements came from Starfire. It was Starfire that con-
tacted Hardin, not Duce, and if Hardin was anyone 's 
' intermediary,8 it was that of Starfire, neither of which is 
a party Defendant to Pla int i f fs complaint. 
Thus, in my opinion, there is no evidence to support 
a finding that Duce employed Starfire as its agent or inter-
mediary so as to make Duce a merchant to whom knowledge 
or skill peculiar to this boat can be at t r ibuted. Nor do I 
believe that , based on the evidence, reasonable minds 
could reach a contrary conclus ion." 
Plaintiff c i tes the case of Carver v s . Denn, supra, to support 
the theory of express warranty. In Carver the buyer relied completely on 
the expertise of the sel ler to provide a suitable air conditioning sys tem. 
The court therein s ta tes at page 121: 
"The Plaintiff (Seller) was aware that Defendant 
(Buyer) knew nothing about air cooling equipment and he 
was a l so aware of the fact that the principal object of the 
negotiations and subsequent sale was to provide a suitable 
cooling system for Defendant 's jewelry s to re . " 
In that fact s i tuat ion, the court found a warranty. In the instant 
c a s e , Plaintiff J. Stanley Fry relied on his own exper t i se . The record is 
replete with references to the amount of time Plaintiff devoted to boats and 
water spor t s . Plaintiff had built one boat, owned four boa t s , and has ridden 
in, skiied behind, and driven many boa t s . Plaintiff chose his own equip-
ment. Defendant made no representat ions to Plaintiff regarding any of that 
equipment. Plaintiff has failed to show that Starfire or Hardin were agents 
of Defendant for the purposes of this c a s e . There was no express warranty 
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made to Plaintiff by Defendant, Duce Sporting Goods, Inc. Even had 
Duce made a representation to Fry, it would have been, in the words of 
U.C.A. , 70A-2-313(2), " . . . . an affirmation merely of the value of 
the goods or a statement purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or 
commendation of the goods," not a warranty. 
(b) Implied Warranty of Fitness for Purpose: 
Plaintiffs contend that Defendant breached an implied warranty 
of fitness for a particular purpose in connection with the sale of the power 
boat. U.C.A.,70A-2-315 states: 
"Where the seller at the time of contracting has 
reason to know any particular purpose for which the goods 
are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's 
skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there 
is unless excluded or modified under the next section an 
implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such pur-
pose." (Emphasis added) 
This provision expressly requires that the Seller know that the 
Buyer is relying on the Seller's skill or judgment in selecting or furnishing 
the goods. In the case of Plaintiffs' power boat, Plaintiffs did not rely on 
Defendant to select or furnish any of the goods. Plaintiff, J. Stanley Fry, 
selected the component parts of the power boat, relying on his own exper-
t i se . The portions of the record cited below show that Plaintiff did not 
rely on the expertise of Defendant. The record shows that Plaintiff was the 
one who suggested that Starfire might have a boat that would fit his needs, 
and at that time he already had a particular engine in mind (R. 233). 
Plaintiff never stated in his testimony that he represented to anyone that 
he specifically wanted a boat to pull up two water skiers. Plaintiffs1 boat 
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does float, go forward on the water, is large enough to sleep on, has a 
top speed satisfactory to Plaintiffs and does pull water skiers (R. 230, 
232, 233, 237, 245, 256 and 272). Plaintiff assumed that Defendant 
knew what he wanted, when in fact he had not explained what he wanted 
from the boat in terms of performance, since he stated he "knew what he 
wanted/ ' (R. 230, 231) and felt that he could recognize the boat that 
could provide what he wanted. In this case, the Buyer did not rely on 
the Seller's skill or judgment in obtaining this boat. Plaintiff cites the 
cases Aluminum Company of America v s . Electro Flo Corporation, 451 F.2d 
1115; Mack Trucks of Arkansas, Inc. v s . Jet Asphalt & Rock Company, 
437 S.W. 2d 459 (Ark.); and Boeing Airplane Company vs . O'Malley, 
329 F.2d 585 (Ca. 8) for the proposition that an implied warranty of fit-
ness should arise in the instant fact situation. These cases are all d i s -
tinguishable on two separate grounds: (1) In each of these cases the 
Buyer had advised the Seller of the specific purposes for which the goods 
were needed, and (2) in each of these cases the Buyer relied on the Seller 
to furnish goods which would be suitable to perform those functions. In 
the case at bar, the Plaintiff neither specifically identified what he wanted 
the boat to do with respect to two skiers (R. 182, 183, 186, 245) nor relied 
on Defendant to furnish him any boat which would perform to any specific 
specifications. Plaintiff chose the parts which made up his power boat, 
relying only on his own expertise. Plaintiff has failed to produce any evi-
dence that Duce had any knowledge or experience which would enable 
them to know what a 454 cubic inch Chevrolet engine with a jet outdrive 
: \ ; V?^-; ' '-.' " "•- n - x- o 
would do in a deep-V hull boat. 
6 7
 Am. Jur. 2d, "Sales/1 § 468, at page 639, states that under 
the Uniform Commercial Code the test for reliance "is whether the Seller 
at the time of contracting has reason to know of reliance by the Buyer on 
the expertise of the Seller." By the time the contract was executed in 
this case . Fry had personally selected the hull, engine, and jet outdrive 
(R. 167, 188), and rejected all advice that was offered him: 
"A: Now, at this time, we were talking about the 455 
cubic inch Olds engine. At this time at my suggestion 
I told them of this jet Chevrolet engine which is the 454 
cubic inch Chevrolet engine with the 450 horsepower." 
(R. 187) 
* * * * * * * * * * 
"Q: And, in fact, you talked to a number of them, 
talked to a number of dealers in town to find out what 
you wanted, did you not? 
"THE WITNESS: I did not talk to them as to what I wanted. 
"Q: (By Mr. Conder) You knew what you wanted? 
"A: I knew what I wanted. 
"Q: You were going out shopping for a boat that would 
meet that quote criteria; is that right? 
"A: Correct." (R. 230, 231) 
* * * * * * * * * * 
"Q: Did the people at Starfire try to talk you out of a 
jet? Did they suggest the twin screws were better than 
the jet? 
"A: They tried to talk me into a jet—into twin screws, 
excuse me. 
"Q: And you preferred the jet? 
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"A: I preferred a single engine." (R. 233) 
* * * * * * * * * * 
NQ: So what you were—Is it fair to say, you were look-
ing for a particular hull and then you were going to put the 
power package into it to meet your specifications? 
"A: No, that is not correct. We were looking, actually, 
for a boat that would come equipped as such. 
"Q: And you were originally looking for a boat that came 
equipped with a Chrysler engine? 
"A: No, I looked for the Chrysler engine after talking 
with Ferral and finding out they had nothing available with 
the power that I wanted. I liked the boat they had, but 
the power I didn't.1 ' (R. 243) 
Plaintiffs have failed to produce any evidence which shows that 
at any time between Fry's initial contact with Duce and the execution of 
the contract that Fry did or said anything to suggest he was looking to the 
skill or judgment of Duce for selecting or providing the parts to the power 
boat. Pre^UCC law did not provide an implied warranty for goods which 
were specially ordered or manufactured to specifications, i . e . , there was 
no warranty from defects which were implicit in the order, plans or specifi-
cations; the UCC Section 2-315 continues these principles in requiring that, 
before an implied warranty of fitness for purpose arises, two tests must be 
met--the Seller must have reason to know the particular purpose for which 
the goods are required, and the Buyer must be relying on the Seller's skill 
or judgment to select or furnish the goods. Plaintiffs cannot pass these 
tests in the instant case . 
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(c) Implied Warranty of Merchantability: 
Section 70A-2-314 provides: 
"Unless excluded or modified (section 70A-2-316), 
a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied 
in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with 
respect to goods of that kind. 
"(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least 
such as (a) pass without objection in the trade under the 
contract description, and . . . . (c) are fit for the 
ordinary purposes for which such goods are used." 
This warranty arises only when these elements exist. Defen-
dant contends: (1) That a warranty of merchantability never arose because 
Duce is not a merchant with respect to goods such as Plaintiffs1 boat, and 
(2) that if such a warranty was created by operation of law, it was not 
breached in the instant case . 
Duce is a sporting goods store which deals in a particular type 
of power boat. None of the power boats which Duce had for sale was sa t i s -
factory to Fry because Duce does not deal in boats designed for the kind of 
high performance that Plaintiffs expected from their power boat. The Trial 
Court stated:. 
11
 In my opinion the mere fact that a sporting goods 
store sells motor boats of a limited kind and variety does 
not mean such a store is a merchant with respect to all 
makes and models of motor boats that may exist on the 
market or of one that might be assembled through the imagi-
nation of one man." (R. 109, 110) 
. Bearing in mind the fact that Fry chose the hull, engine, and 
jet outdrive himself and the fact that Duce made no representations as to 
the performance of the parts separately or of the whole, it is helpful to 
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consider U.C.A. , 70A-2-104, which defines "merchant'1: 
111
 Merchant1 means a person who deals in goods of 
the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds himself out 
as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or 
goods involved in the transaction or to whom such knowl-
edge or skill may be attributed by his employment of an 
agent or broker or other intermediary who by his occupation 
holds himself out as having such knowledge or skil l ." 
Duce did not deal in the kind of high powered, high performance 
boat that Plaintiffs required. Duce never,during the entire series of con-
tacts with Plaintiffs, held itself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar 
to the goods involved in the transaction. No employee of Duce made any 
such representation, and Plaintiffs have not alleged that Starfire or Hardin 
Marine were agents of Duce. Because Duce was not a merchant with respect 
to the power boat in question, an implied warranty of merchantability running 
from Duce to Fry never arose in the instant transaction. In this transaction, 
Duce was merely a conduit through which Plaintiffs1 purchase of a high-
performance power boat was arranged. Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code, 
2nd Edition, Volume 1, "Sales," page 577, states: 
"An implied warranty of merchantability only arises 
in the case of a sale by a merchant who sells regularly the 
kind of goods in question." 
Plaintiffs have failed to present any evidence showing that Duce 
is in the business of regularly selling power boats such as the one in this 
sa le . 
Even if an implied warranty of merchantability did arise in this 
transaction, it was not breached by Duce. U.C.A. , 70A-2-314(2)(a) and 
(c) requires that to be merchantable goods must pass without objection in 
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the trade under the contract description and be fit for the ordinary purposes 
for which such goods are used . This is a minimum standard, requiring a 
power boat to function as a power boat . In this c a s e , the power boat pur-
chased by Fry was used by them as a power boat for approximately two 
y e a r s , accumulating 74 hours running time on the eng ine . Plaintiffs are 
satisfied with the speed of the boat . Plaintiffs have found occasion to 
use the boat for some purpose in two years of boat ing. In short , Plaintiffs 
complain only that the boat doesn ' t fulfill adequately one of the several 
functions that it was purchased for — specif ical ly, pulling two water skiers 
up out of the water as Plaintiffs expected the boat to do when they purchased 
i t . Plaintiffs don*t complain that any of the individual parts don't function 
correctly-. Ins tead, Plaintiffs complain that the unit put together to the 
express instructions of J. Stanley Fry doesn ' t function because the parts are 
incompatible. Plaintiffs are therefore complaining about the insufficiency 
of design of the boat . Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code, "Sa l e s , " 
Volume 1, page 579, s t a t e s : 
"The warranty of merchantability does not include 
any warranty as to the sufficiency of the design of the 
product. The Code does not change the common-law rule 
that in order for there to be an implied warranty of the 
sufficiency of the design the sel ler must be responsible for 
the des ign, either by i ts init iation or adoption. Conversely 
where the buyer is responsible for the design the sel ler 
makes no implied warranty of i ts f i tness or of the fi tness of 
the product genera l ly ." 
(See a l so School Supply Service Co . v . I . H. Kenney & C o . , 
(Ca. 5 F l a . ) , 410 F.2d 481 , Official Code Comment 8 2-316:1 Pt. 9.) 
In this c a s e , Plaintiff is complaining about his own design and 
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no implied warranty of merchantability extends this far. This boat works 
as a boat; it f loats , moves forward and backwards on the water at an 
adequate speed, it performs all the functions of a boat and would pass 
without objection in the trade for power boats; it pas ses the t e s t of 
merchantabili ty. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFFS HAVE NOT RESCINDED THE CONTRACT NOR 
HAVE THEY MADE TIMELY REVOCATION OF ACCEPTANCE, 
Plaintiffs pray for the resc iss ion of the contract . In order to 
effect r esc i s s ion , the Buyers must tender back whatever a s s e t s they have 
received by reason of the contract . 
In the case of Perry v . Woodall , 20 Utah 2d 399, 438 P.2d 813 
(1968), this Court s t a t e s : v 
" . . . The law is well set t led that one electing 
to rescind a contract must tender back to the other con-
tracing party whatever property of value he has received. 
Woodall e lected to retain possess ion of the corporate 
a s s e t s and to carry on the business until it was taken over 
in the receivership proceedings. We are of the opinion 
that Woodall waited too long and that he cannot now 
rescind the contrac t ." 
In the principal c a s e , the Plaintiffs have had the boat for two 
years and, although they have had numerous conferences with the Defendant, 
they have never once tendered back the boat . 
The Idaho Supreme Court, in the case of Wettro v s . White , 
232 P. 2d 973 (Id. 1954), held that a Plaintiff who remained in possess ion 
of property for a period of two years waived any right of resc iss ion on 
the contract by reason of failure to tender back the property before the 
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t ime. The Court said: 
"Having thus remained in possess ion of the 
property and the bus ines s , operating it and treating it 
as their own during this period of nearly two y e a r s , 
the plaintiffs waived any right they had to resc i ss ion 
of the contract , or to the recovery of the payments 
made." 
Even the Code provision, as quoted by the Plaintiffs in their 
Brief, U . C . A . , 70A-2-608, subparagraph (2), requires that: 
"Revocation of acceptance must occur within a 
reasonable time after the buyer discovers or should 
have discovered the ground for it . . . ." 
Again, the Utah Supreme Court, in the case of Knudsen Music 
Co . v . Masterson, 121 Utah 252, 240 P.2d 973, s ta ted: 
"In further support of the determination made 
by the tr ial court, it should be observed that ordinarily 
where a buyer continues to use a defective machine to 
derive benefits therefrom he waives his right to r e s c i s -
sion . . . . (Citing case:) and if he wishes to rescind 
a contract he must manifest his elect ion to do so without 
undue delay or the right will be l o s t . Will iston on " S a l e s , " 
Revised Edition, Sec . 6 1 1 . " (Emphasis added) 
Anderson's "Uniform Commercial Code ," Volume 2, Section 
2-711:24, at page 422, s t a t e s : 
"The Code makes no provision with respect to the 
return of the goods when there has been a cancel lat ion of 
the contract . The continuation of the general principles 
of equity, however, should be regarded as sufficient to 
retain the pre-Code requirement of the restoration of the 
s ta tus quo as a condition to r e sc i s s ion , unless waived by 
the party who would be entit led to the return of the goods , 
namely, the se l le r . That i s , a buyer seeking to cancel 
must return or offer to return the goods to the se l l e r . " 
(Emphasis added) 
The Plaintiffs in this case not only ask for resc i ss ion but they 
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further pray for damages in addition to the resc iss ion of the contract . 
67 Am. Iur.2d, " S a l e s , " Section 516, at page 696, s t a t es : 
"Accordingly, resc iss ion puts an end to any right 
to recover the contract price or damages for breach of 
contract , relegating the aggrieved party merely to a right 
of restitution with respect to any performance rendered by 
him." 
See a l so 17 Am. Tur.2d, "Cont rac t s / 1 Section 516, page 1002, 
which s ta tes as follows: 
"As a general thing, the effect of a resc iss ion is 
to extinguish the contract and to annihilate it so effec-
tively that in contemplation of law it has never had any 
ex is tence , even for the purpose of being broken. Accord-
ingly, it has been said that a lawful resc i ss ion of an 
agreement puts an end to it for all purposes , not only to 
preclude the recovery of the breach of the contract . An 
election to rescind a contract waives the right to sue upon 
i t . After resc iss ion for a breach, there is no right to sue 
on the contract for damages for such breach. A party 
rescinding for a breach or other good cause may, however, 
have a right to resti tution with respect to any performance 
on his part . 
"The effect of a resc iss ion of an agreement is to put 
the parties back in the same position they were in prior to 
the making of the contract . At l e a s t , it has the legal effect 
of entitling each of the parties to be restored as far as is 
possible to the condition he was in before the contract was 
made." (Emphasis added) 
Plaintiffs at no time notified Duce or any other party that they 
were rescinding the contract until this lawsuit was filed on the 12th day of 
September, 1973. In Plaintiffs' Brief, it is al leged that the evidence shows 
that Plaintiffs rescinded the contract . At no point in the record is there any 
evidence showing Plaintiffs rescinded the contract . In fact , the record 
s ta tes on pages 236 and 237: 
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"Q: During this two-year period, have you ever 
tendered the boat and was offering to give the boat 
back to Duce's and saying you wanted to get your 
money back? 
"A: I told Mr. Malouf at Duce if he could not make 
this boat perform as it was represented, I felt I should 
either get a boat that would function or my money 
refunded. 
"Q: But did you say to him, 'I don't want this boat. 
It is yours, I—* 
"A: No, I did not. 
"Q: Or words in that substance ? 
"A: I don't think so . " 
Mr. Fry did not tender the boat back or demand his money back 
until this suit was filed and this was not within a reasonable time. After 
the time that Mr. Fry made the above statements to Duce, Defendant con-
tinued trying to make the boat satisfactory to Plaintiffs through adjustments 
which did not satisfy Plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs argue as if to suggest that revocation of acceptance 
and rescission are the same. Plaintiffs cite Anderson on the Uniform Com-
mercial Code to support the motion of revocation, when it is the principle 
of rescission that is vital to the question of remedy in the instant case . 
Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code, "Sales,11 Volume 2, at page 246, 
states: 
"The concept of revocation of acceptance is not to 
be confused with rescission. Otherwise stated, the require-
ment of a tender in order to restore the status quo which is 
essential to a rescission does not apply to a revocation of 
acceptance." 
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Rescission requires the tender back of the goods to the seller, 
as defined by this Court in Perry v, Woodall, supra. The Trial Court, 
after hearing the evidence, held that there was neither rescission by Plain-
tiffs, nor revocation of acceptance within a reasonable time, and that 
filing a lawsuit did not by itself constitute either rescission or revoation. 
The Trial Court's conclusion should be affirmed. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO PROVE ANY DAMAGES ARISING 
FROM BREACH OF WARRANTY. 
If we assume, for the sake of argument, that the Plaintiffs are 
entitled to any damages and since the Plaintiffs in this case are seeking 
damages for a breach of warranty, it is important to consider the Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 70A-2-714 (2) which provides: 
"The measure of damages for breach of warranty is 
the difference at the time and place of acceptance between 
the value of the goods accepted and the value they would 
have had if they had been as warranted, unless special 
circumstances show proximate damages of a different 
amount.11 
Plaintiffs have not shown any difference in value on the merchan-
dise by reason of any claimed breach of warranty. There is a failure of 
proof of any recoverable damages in this case . 
The difference in value means difference in fair and reasonable 
value but not the difference in value to some one person or for any one use . 
(Daily v . Holiday, 15 N.W.2d 477) Plaintiffs cite Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 70A-2-711, to support their argument for damages. A reading of the 
statute shows that is not applicable to the instant situation. The section 
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provides the procedure for collecting damages, not for a s s e s s i n g them. 
In this c a s e , the Plaintiffs have failed to show damages . Plaintiffs 
contend that the boat is completely unacceptable and the measure of 
damages should therefore be the purchase pr ice . Plaintiffs' contention 
is not wel l taken after two years use of the boat . Plaintiffs have pre - . 
sented no evidence to show any difference in value between the boat a s 
it i s and the boat as Plaintiffs al lege it was warranted to b e . Plaintiffs 
have a l so failed to show any breach of warranty diminishing the value of 
the boat . If there is no breach of warranty, there can be no damages under 
70A-2-714. If there was no warranty with regard to the performance factor 
Plaintiffs complain of, then there can be no damages . Defendant contends 
that both of these propositions are correct . There was no warranty and 
there was no warranty breached. 
POINT IV 
THE LOWER COURT'S JUDGMENT ORDERING PLAINTIFFS TO 
MAKE PAYMENT OF THE UNPAID BALANCE OF THE PURCHASE 
PRICE PLUS ATTORNEY'S FEES SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
Plaintiffs have not argued in their Brief that the Judgment entered 
by the lower court awarding the Defendant the unpaid balance of the pur-
chase contract plus at torney 's fees and cos t s should be reversed or se t 
a s i d e . Never the less , inasmuch a s they seek to have that Judgment set 
as ide in the relief they ask this Court to grant on appea l , Defendant herein 
des i res to support i ts contention that said Judgment should be affirmed. 
Defendant filed a Counterclaim in th is matter based on Plaintiffs1 
failure and refusal to continue making payment a s required in the contract 
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of sale (R. 16). After the lower court granted Defendant's Motion to Dis-
miss Plaintiffs' Complaint for failure to state a cause of action, the parties 
entered into a stipulation as to the amount of unpaid balance on the contract 
of sale, attorney's fees and costs . A hearing was held on Duce's Counter-
claim and, based on the stipulation regarding unpaid contract price and 
after argument over the attorney's fees, the Court entered its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusion of Law and Judgment awarding Defendant the sum of 
$8,879.14 principal and interest, $10.00 costs , and $1,000.00 attorney's 
fees. This Court should affirm the lower court's Judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court, in granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, 
viewed Plaintiffs' evidence in the light most favorable to them and found 
that they had failed to state a cause of action. Plaintiffs have failed to 
show a right to relief in the following particulars: 
1. There is no evidence of any representations made to the 
Plaintiffs by this Defendant. 
2 . There is no evidence of a breach of warranty for merchant-
ability since the boat is usable as a boat and has been used by Plaintiffs 
for two years and has approximately 74 hours time of actual operation. 
3 . There is no evidence of any breach of any implied warranty 
of fitness. 
4 . There is no evidence of any agency between Starfire and this 
Defendant. < 
5. There is no evidence of any affirmative representation made 
- 23 -
by Starfire which would be binding upon this Defendant. 
6 . The Plaintiffs seek resc i s s ion and have failed to make a 
tender and therefore waived the right of r e sc i s s ion . 
7 . Plaintiffs have failed to prove any damages for any breach 
of warranty, 
8 . There is a complete failure of proof of any damages , 
9 . Judgment for Defendant is supported by the ev idence . 
Plaintiffs have not argued that it should be set a s i d e , and said Judgment 
should be affirmed along with the lower court ' s Order dismissing Plaintiffs1 
Complaint. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Dean E. Conder 
Stephen L. Henriod 
NIELSEN, CONDERf HENRIOD AND 
GOTTFREDSON 
Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent 
and Third-Party Plaintiff 
410 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
MOTION FOR ORDER GRANTING ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL 
Defendant/Respondent, Duce Sporting Goods, I n c . , respectfully 
moves the Court for i t s Order awarding at torney 's fees on appeal in th is 
matter for legal services incurred in connection with the appea l , the 
amount of sa id fees to be determined upon remand on the bas i s of evidence 
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t o be presented to the lower court . All a t torney's fees granted to date in 
the lower court are attributable solely to legal services performed prior to 
the appeal in this matter. This Motion is made pursuant to the Retail I n s t a l l -
ment Contract and Security Agreement executed by the parties which provides 
under Additional Terms, paragraph 2: 
"For value received, Debtor by this contract grants 
a security interest in the personal property described 
' herein . . . The security interest of aforesaid shal l a l so 
secure payment of court c o s t s , a t torney 's fees . . . and 
other charges , as permitted by law, and, 
2 . . . . In the event said collateral is sold , 
Debtor shal l be l iable for any deficiency . . . including 
secured party 's reasonable at torney 's fees and legal 
expenses , if allowed by l aw . " 
The above quoted provisions entit le Defendant/Respondent to 
compensation for at torney's fees incurred in responding to Pla int i f fs / 
Appellants ' Appeal, and a failure to award said fees would cause a reduc-
tion in the amount of recovery on the unpaid balance of the purchase con-
t r ac t . • 
DATED this day of December, 1975. 
Dean E. Conder 
Stephen L. Henriod 
NIELSEN, CONDER, HENRIOD AND 
GOTTFREDSON 
Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent 
and Third-Party Plaintiff 
410 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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SERVED the foregoing Brief of Respondent by mailing two copies 
thereof, postage prepaid, to Carman E. Kipp, Attorney for Plaintiffs, 520 
Boston Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, two copies to Paul N . 
Cot ro-Manes , Attorney for Third-Party Defendant Starfire Indust r ies , I n c . , 
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Wilcox, Attorney for Third-Party Defendant Hardin Marine, 600 Deseret 
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